



I arrive far too early at Zaventem Airport in Brussels, Belgium, for my visit on 28 September 2018.
I’m making my way to the security check where a Ryanair staff strikers’ post is located. My contact
at the Belgian trade union gives my colleague and me a warm welcome, but the Ryanair staff are
wary: ‘who are these people and what do they want?’
What we wanted was clear: to get to know the people and details behind the historic transna-
tional strike they were staging. As a senior researcher at the European Trade Union Institute
I spend most of my time studying European works councils, institutions that bring together
workers’ representatives from different national affiliates of a single multinational. One of the
hopes of the trade union movement is that these works councils could be the breeding ground for
transnational solidarity and, why not, genuine transnational action in multinationals. In this
instance we have a notoriously anti-union multinational, with no real European works council nor
a tradition of transnational trade union coordination, suddenly organising a transnational strike.
Reason enough for us to take a closer look.
After some time and a few explanations, we get talking and learn more about this historic
transnational strike. Ryanair cabin crew based in Belgium are staging a strike together with cabin
crews based in Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany. Pilots in all these countries
have also joined the action, causing Ryanair to cancel about 150 flights. This is the largest
coordinated union action in Ryanair history, and it didn’t come out of nowhere.
Unions and Ryanair
The unions knew from the very start they would have a difficult time organising at Ryanair.
Michael O’Leary, Ryanair’s famous CEO, is also famous for his anti-union attitude and has never
hesitated expressing this in public. In the 1990s he stated that he would close the airline before
negotiating with unions (Cooper, 2018: 129) and in 2013 he called the pilot unions a ‘busted flush’.
In 2017 he declared that ‘hell would freeze over’ before he would talk to unions, and in 2018 he
talked about the ‘crazy Belgian unions’.
And he was prepared to put his principles into practice. The first major unionisation attempt in
Ryanair came in 1998, led by the Dublin-based baggage handlers. Once they realised they were
paid considerably less than their colleagues at other airports and working for other airlines, they
decided, with the support of Ireland’s SIPTU, to stage a strike. What followed would be a good
story for a drama, with the baggage handlers striking, being locked out, circumventing the lock-
out, other staff staging solidarity strikes, the government stepping in with a mediation attempt and
the case ending up in the Supreme Court (O’Sullivan and Gunnigle, 2008). It ended with a
company victory, giving Ryanair free rein not to have to engage with unions for the next couple
of decades.
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In the following years many smaller-scale attempts were made to unionise Ryanair, but none
were successful and many led to immediate site closures. Ryanair even pulled out from Denmark
completely when it became clear that recognising unions and negotiating with them would be
unavoidable.
In 2017 and 2018, the situation changed dramatically for Ryanair. First, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) decided that Belgian judges were competent in ruling over the case of a cabin crew
member based in Charleroi, Belgium. This also meant that the legislation applying to the Belgium-
based employees should be Belgian (Gracos, 2019). This went right against Ryanair’s policy of
dealing with their staff under Irish legislation.
Second (and arguably more important), a staffing crisis at the end of 2017 led to the cancellation
of about 20,000 flights. In short, Ryanair was out of pilots. New flight time limitation rules came
into force and the pilots had been working overtime over the whole summer. Additionally, the
tightening pilot labour market made it difficult for Ryanair to hire new pilots. The pilots saw
the balance of power shift in their favour and used it immediately to push for union recognition and
collective bargaining (Trif and Paolucci, 2019). In Ireland, Italy, Germany and Portugal pilots
moved towards strike action, pushing O’Leary to declare on 15 December 2017 that he was ready
to negotiate with the pilot trade unions. This was a historic move. In the end only the German
Vereinigung Cockpit (VC) staged a brief four-hour strike as Ryanair refused to talk to two of their
five union representatives. Roughly one month later, the first collective agreement was signed in
the United Kingdom (30 January 2018).
The dam had been breached. The pilots’ successes spilled over to the cabin crew, who arguably
are in a worse position than the pilots. The issues they face include the following1: cabin crew work
under Irish contracts and legislation, not the legislation of their home bases; Ryanair personnel are
paid only for hours in the air, while all preparation time, standby time and other time are unpaid;
when Ryanair staff call in sick several times, they are summoned to Dublin for a disciplinary
hearing at which they are required to explain themselves; a large part of their salaries is based on
‘performance’, which mainly means on-board sales of food and products, and the work schedules
of the cabin crew are often changed in order to avoid having to pay for overnight stays. This means
that Ryanair staff cannot really have a social life.
In February 2018, a Portuguese cabin crew union took the initiative by announcing a three-day
strike which took place in March and April of 2018. This national strategy was ineffective,
however, as Ryanair called in staff and planes from other countries to minimise the impact of the
strike. The Belgian, Italian and Spanish unions declared solidarity with the Portuguese and called
on staff not to break the strike. This experience clearly showed the limits of national action against
a company like Ryanair and pushed the unions toward a more European strategy. The Portuguese
strike also showed, however, that one can actually strike against Ryanair without fearing imme-
diate retaliation in terms of lay-offs and base closures, which was previously unheard of at the
company (Gracos, 2019).
After this experience, the cabin crew unions of several countries prepared for a real transna-
tional strike under the banner of the ‘striking group’. In April 2018, a coalition of unions from
Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain rallied around three unified demands: (i) the application of local
law to their contracts instead of Irish law, (ii) Ryanair’s agreement to negotiations with trade union
representatives and (iii) the application of identical working conditions to cabin crew working for
1 For a full analysis of the working conditions of cabin crew at Ryanair (and other carriers) see the report for
the European Commission (Brannigan et al., 2019).
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Ryanair, Crewlink, Workforce or any other third party. The unions also agreed that Ryanair had to
comply with these three demands by the end of June and if not, that they would organise coordi-
nated industrial action during the summer of 2018. Ryanair obviously did not deliver by end of
June and so a first transnational strike was set for 25 and 26 July. The strike was well supported by
staff, but did not lead immediately to concessions. Moreover, Ryanair tried to retaliate by announ-
cing base reductions or closures and sending ‘no show’ letters to striking staff, which could
endanger their future promotions or demands. Given the success of the strike action, however,
the company could not retaliate with massive lay-offs.
In the meantime, German Ver.di cabin crew members also voted in favour of union action and a
second strike was staged on 10 August 2018. The third and main strike happened on 28 September
2018 when cabin crew from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain staged
a genuine international strike.
In parallel with this, the European Transport Federation (ETF) and the International Transport
Federation (ITF) brought together representatives of cabin crew from over 21 countries in July
2018 as part of their campaign on Ryanair. The result was the Ryanair Crew Charter, which
included demands on working conditions, work schedules, sick-pay, sales and calls for the appli-
cation of the law of the home base, rather than Irish law, for cabin crew contracts.
The strike was a success as Ryanair was forced to accept union recognition and (almost every-
where) immediate application of local legislation to Ryanair staff. A year later, according to an
ETF and ITF report, Ryanair signed agreements in nine2 of the 20 countries with crew bases,
covering about half of the workforce (ITF ETF, 2018).
In 2019, a new transnational strike was in the making, this time planned for 27 September, with
pilots and cabin crew from Belgium, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom announcing indus-
trial action. The immediate reason for the protest was the announcement that Ryanair would cut
about 900 jobs and would close four bases in Spain. However, as the UK union decided not to go on
strike and the German unions refused to join, the Belgian union decided to stage only solidarity
action. In the end, strikes were held only in Portugal and Spain.
Divide and rule
Discussing all the strategies used by Ryanair to obstruct unionisation would take too long, but two
practices used as part of a divide-and-rule strategy deserve further discussion: the use of out-
sourced staff and the international mobility of employees. While the first is still an effective
obstacle to real organising and the development of solidarity, the second has been turned from a
negative into a positive for transnational solidarity.
While all Ryanair employees wear (roughly) the same uniform (which they have to pay for
themselves), there are many differences between Ryanair staff. In fact, the company works with
directly hired staff, (bogus) outsourced staff and (bogus) self-employed staff. These different
contracts (with different working conditions) have effectively combined to break solidarity
between staff members. All employees must start with an agency contract and can only hope to
become a directly hired Ryanair employee at a later stage. They are therefore less inclined to join
collective actions.
The second method with which Ryanair tries to divide and rule is its base assignments. Cabin
crew are based in several locations in Europe. Depending on demand, the season and changing
2 United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium and Greece.
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company policies, however, staff are frequently moved from one base to another. This works
effectively as (to use a fictional example) the Polish base may have cabin crew staff from Portugal,
Czechia and Spain. As turnover was frequent, no real solidarity was created in a single base and as
all employees are foreign, relations with local unions were difficult.
Over time, however, this negative became a positive for transnational solidarity. Given the low
pay and uncertain duration of base assignment, Ryanair staff mainly live together in collectively
rented houses close to the airport (and therefore a long way from anything else). These houses work
as micro communities and create local solidarity. This, combined with frequent mobility, has made
staff realise they are all members of a single transnational flexible class with common interests.
The resulting transnational Facebook and WhatsApp groups formed the groundwork for the trans-
national collective actions Ryanair witnessed in 2018.
In this way, the Ryanair industrial action was built from the bottom up. Solidarity and con-
sciousness of common problems grew between cabin crew members of different countries and
bases, and between pilots and cabin crew members.
Going transnational?
If you can organise at Ryanair, you can organise anywhere. And in 2018, Europe observed that,
indeed, one can organise at Ryanair and bring the company to the negotiation table. However, this
does not guarantee fruitful (and definitely not cooperative) social dialogue in the future. One of the
main obstacles to this is the mismatch between the management level and the bargaining level.
Currently, Ryanair is engaging in collective bargaining only on a country-by-country basis. This is,
however, at odds with the company’s highly centralised management and highly international and
mobile workforce. As the 2018 ETF report states, ‘crew across the network facing similar issues
can only resolve them on a transnational basis. [ . . . ] However, Ryanair’s ideological opposition to
transnational engagement means it refuses to approach such issues on a logically coherent and cost/
operationally effective basis’ (ITF ETF, 2018).
The experience of 2018 also showed that you can only get a multinational to the negotiation
table by going transnational with employee action. In the process, however, a difference of opinion
emerged concerning what ‘going transnational’ really means. On one side, the International Trans-
port Federation (ITF) and the European Transport Federation (ETF) mounted a campaign to
pressure Ryanair to the negotiation table. This campaign included transnational coordination of
national union actions, lobbying of the EU, supporting unionisation efforts in Central and Eastern
European bases and coordinating litigation to have national law applied to Ryanair staff.
An alliance of trade unions (most also members of ITF and ETF), on the other hand, considered
that transnational industrial action was the only way forward and formed a ‘striking group’ which
organised the 2018 transnational strikes (Gracos, 2019).
While ranks largely closed in the aftermath of the strikes, the whole episode shows that there is
an uneasy fit between national trade union structures, the genuinely international (and mobile)
workforce and European trade union structures. In the words of one Ryanair organiser, ‘the
Ryanair workforce is and thinks much more European than the unions are and do’.
Ryanair must change
After our visit to the Zaventem strike post, my colleague and I received a blue t-shirt with the bold
yellow slogan: ‘Ryanair Must Change’. We left the strikers with a mix of disgust, fascination and
hope. Disgust because of the stories the crew shared about employer retaliation and their working
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and living conditions. But mostly, we were fascinated and hopeful in hearing about how they had
created international solidarity through WhatsApp and Facebook groups, how the first actions
crystallised their engagement and how strength in numbers was giving them a feeling of power, but
mostly recognition and identity.
While the initial victories have to be celebrated, nothing is certain for the future. While the
staff is currently very aware of the need for and power of transnational solidarity, all the trade
unions involved will need to follow through and realise that, faced with stateless multinational
companies, national strategies and traditions of industrial dialogue are secondary. And institu-
tions will need to be created to ensure continuous transnational representation. Who knows,
maybe a European works council might be needed after all and if so, I’ll be ready with some
research insights for them.
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